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Nuclear proliferation and
testing: A tale of two treaties

Pierce S. Corden and David Hafemeister

Despite progress in reducing stockpiles after the end of the Cold War, the disturbing
actions of some nations could spread nuclear weapon capabilities and enlarge
existing arsenals.

T

he first nuclear weapon explosion, codenamed Trinity, took place at Alamogordo,
New Mexico, on 16 July 1945. Since then
eight countries have carried out more than
2000 nuclear tests with yields from a fraction
of a kiloton to some 50 megatons. (Yield is the
amount of TNT needed for an equivalent explosion.)
The public anxiety over nuclear testing began
shortly after World War II, as the powerful but pol
luting atmospheric explosions exposed entire com
munities, known as downwinders, to the health
hazards of radioactive fallout. Governmental anxi
ety followed in the late 1950s, and the US, USSR, and
UK entered a moratorium on nuclear testing, only
to have it fall apart three years later when the French
began testing and the three countries resumed test
ing ever more powerful weapons with a vengeance.
In 1963, three years after President John F.
Kennedy warned the public that as many as 20 coun
tries might obtain nuclear capabilities by the end of
the decade, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was
negotiated to help curb the spread. That treaty pro
hibits testing in the atmosphere, under water, and
in outer space, but not underground. Satellite sur
veillance and seismology were both very new at the
time, and effective verification of a ban on under
ground explosions was widely thought impossible
without onsite inspections, which were not part
of the LTBT. Nonetheless, in 1968 the international
commitment to comprehensively end nuclear test
ing was reaffirmed in another agreement, the Nu
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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The NPT was built on a strategic bargain: The
overwhelming majority of countries agreed to join
the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, to not ac
quire nuclear weapons, and to allow inspections of
their nuclear facilities. In return, the five nuclear
weapon states—the US, UK, and USSR (now Russia),
later joined by China and France and collectively
known as the P5—pledged to work toward the elim
ination of their nuclear arsenals and to allow the
sharing of peaceful nuclear technology with the
non-nuclear-weapon states.1
At the time, the NPT signatories understood
that the total elimination of all nuclear weapons was
likely to be far in the future. Nearly half a century
later, that’s still the case. But India, Pakistan, Israel,
and North Korea are not parties to the NPT, and
dealing with their capabilities and those of the P5
proceeds in parallel with efforts involving the non
nuclear NPT parties. Figure 1 outlines the history of
nuclear weapon proliferation since the first test in
1945. The US and USSR–Russia stockpiles have each
declined by almost an order of magnitude from
their peaks; the UK and French stockpiles have
Pierce Corden is a visiting scholar at the American
Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington,
DC, and previously led the State Department and US Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) offices on the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. David Hafemeister
is an emeritus physics professor at California Polytechnic State
University in San Luis Obispo and was formerly at the State
Department, ACDA, and the National Academy of Sciences.

April 2014

Physics Today

41

modestly declined. For others, either the picture is
uncertain or the numbers are increasing.
If Iran were to build the bomb, in violation of
its NPT obligations, how would NPT non-nuclear
weapon states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt,
react? If the US, China, or Russia were to resume
nuclear testing, would that lead to testing by others
and to new deployments of nuclear weapons? The
NPT “regime” extends beyond the treaty in numer
ous ways to help counter those and other risks.
Tools such as diplomacy between nations, arms control, economic sanctions, safeguards and protocols
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
physical security for nuclear materials and weapons,
counterproliferation military strikes, port and bor
der security, limits on the production of weapons
useable uranium and plutonium, and the Prolif
eration Security Initiative—a global effort to stop
trafficking in weapons of mass destruction—are all
part of the broader regime. That interconnected
system must be resilient to unpredictable changes.
Further nuclear testing or withdrawal by a nation
from the NPT would pose serious challenges to
the regime.
In November 2013 two dozen experts spoke at
a short course, cosponsored by the American Phys
ical Society’s Forum on Physics and Society and the
George Washington University’s Elliott School of In
ternational Affairs, to discuss those and other current
threats to international security posed by nuclear
weapons and related technologies.2 This article fo
cuses on the NPT and national security—particularly
as both are affected by the legal status of the closely
linked Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and the ongoing developments in Iran and
other nations.

The NPT–CTBT intersection
International law is not domestic law. Enforcement
of international nonproliferation agreements in
cludes measures decided by the UN Security Coun
cil. But those measures are effective only if most of
the global community of nations adhere to them.
Unfortunately, confidence in the NPT has been com
plicated by the fact that the CTBT, opened for sig
nature in 1996, has yet to enter into force—that is,
be ratified into law by China, Egypt, Iran, Israel,
India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the US. (See the
article by Jeremiah Sullivan, PHYSICS TODAY, March
1998, page 24.)
The holdouts are troubling. For one thing, there
is broad international support for the CTBT: The
treaty has been signed by 183 states, has been ratified
by 162, and bans nuclear tests at any yield, at any
place, and for all time. For another, during negotia
tions to secure a permanent extension of the NPT,
France, Russia, the UK, and the US sent a letter, dated
19 April 1995 (China later agreed), to the NPT Review
and Extension Conference promising a CTBT:1
We reaffirm our determination to con
tinue to negotiate intensively, as a high
priority, a universal and multilaterally
and effectively verifiable comprehen
sive nuclear test-ban treaty, and we
42
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Figure 1. Nuclear weapons, counted. The
approximate number of stockpiled weapons in
each country is keyed to the date of its first nuclear
test. (Adapted from data of Hans Kristensen,
http://www.fas.org.) The following are 2013 totals:
US, 4650 stockpiled, 2120 operational; Russia, 4300
stockpiled, 1600 operational; UK, 225; France, 300;
China, 250; India, 90–110; Pakistan, 100–120; and
North Korea (DPRK), 5–10.
pledge our support for its conclusion
without delay. . . . We call upon all
States parties to the [NPT] to make the
treaty provisions permanent. This will
be crucial for the full realization of the
goals set out in Article VI.
In 1999, when the US Senate considered giving its
advice and consent to ratification, it declined to do
so. In the hearings and floor debate, the verifiability
of the treaty and the effectiveness of the US nuclear
weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosive
testing were principal issues cited as problematic.
The contention caused by the failure of the US and
the other seven states to ratify the CTBT does not
help develop the global consensus needed to en
force nonproliferation undertakings. Without the
CTBT, the NPT is perceived as a treaty of unbal
anced obligations.
A ban on nuclear tests is a nonproliferation and
arms-control measure that raises the barrier for
states to move toward nuclear weapons and blocks
existing nuclear powers from substantial new tech
nical advances. Although such a barrier would not
prevent the development of simple gun-type
weapons, which typically do not require testing
to work, it prevents development of thermonuclear
weapons and the miniaturization of nuclear weapons
for missiles.3
At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all 189
NPT members viewed the CTBT’s entry into force
as essential for a strengthened nonproliferation
regime. In December 2013 the United Nations Gen
eral Assembly urged all nations to sign and ratify
the CTBT on a vote of 181 yes, 1 no (North Korea),
and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria). The
Obama administration has declared its support for
Senate action to ratify the treaty.

Seismic monitoring
Since 1963, when the LTBT was adopted, the capa
bilities of seismology to detect underground nuclear
explosions have steadily improved. By the time the
CTBT was negotiated at the Geneva Conference on
www.physicstoday.org
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Figure 2. Seismic spectrographs taken in Mudanjiang,
China, record the ground-velocity amplitudes of three
events a few hundred kilometers away in North Korea: a
9 October 2006 nuclear test (top) of magnitude 4 (0.7 kt
Nuclear test
equivalent yield); a 16 December 2004 magnitude 4 earth
Sn Lg
quake (middle); and a 19 August 1998 underground
chemical explosion (bottom; 0.002 kt equivalent yield). The
nuclear and chemical explosions cause the sudden onset
Earthquake
of compressive waves that travel either through the crust
Sn? Lg?
and mantle (Pn) or through the crust alone (Pg) and the later
onset of weak shear waves (Sn and Lg) and Rayleigh waves,
a type of surface wave. Compressive waves in earthquakes
Chemical explosion
emerge more slowly and their shear waves are stronger than
in the explosions; indeed, the shear waves are so weak in
90
120
150
180 both nuclear and chemical explosions that labelling their
TIME (s)
emergence in spectra is difficult. (Adapted from ref. 11.)
Rayleigh wave

Disarmament in the mid 1990s, seismic instru
mentation had matured so dramatically that it and
other test-detection technologies provided a very
effective means to verify states’ compliance with the
new treaty.
The CTBT establishes the International Monitor
ing System (IMS), networks comprising 321 seismic,
radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound sen
sors around the world—84% of them certified, 5% in
stalled, 6% in construction, and 5% planned. Thanks
to the relatively high density of the 170-station seis
mic network, states have access to a richer set of data
than was possible when the LTBT was negotiated,
when there was no regular access to territories of
states of interest, particularly the USSR. The seismic
network can detect explosions at more reduced
yield levels than previously. “National technical
means”—the nationally owned and operated seis
mic and other sensors, reconnaissance satellites,
ships, and aircraft—provide an additional and pow
erful source of verification that exceeds the capabil
ity of the IMS networks.
Regional and long-range seismic waves are
used to distinguish between explosions and earth
quakes, estimate the magnitude of an event, and
determine its location so that follow-up onsite in
spections can be carried out in ambiguous cases.
Consider figure 2, which compares seismograms
from a low-magnitude earthquake, a chemical ex
plosion, and the 9 October 2006 nuclear explosion
in North Korea. The nuclear test was detected
widely by the IMS and other stations in South
Korea, China, and Japan. A later North Korean nu
clear explosion, on 12 February 2013, was detected
by 96 IMS stations, which were able to locate the test
site to within 8 km.
Regional waves predominantly travel through
Earth’s crust and upper mantle and are strongly af
fected by local geology, which can complicate inter
pretation, but they offer better, more detailed results
than long-range waves. In 2001 seismologists Vitaly
Khalturin, Tanya Rautian, and Paul Richards ana
lyzed the regional signals collected between 1961
and 1989 at distances 500–1500 km from under
ground explosions at the former Soviet test site at
Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. Usefully detailed seis
mic information was found in the old Soviet data
from all but two of 340 tests with yields over a ton.4
Newer broadband seismographs are suffi
www.physicstoday.org

ciently sensitive that, according to a 2002 National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) study,5 underground
nuclear explosions conducted in hard rock anywhere
in Europe, Asia, North Africa, and North America
can be reliably detected and identified as explosions
down to a yield of 0.1 kt using IMS data. The denser
the seismic network in a particular region, the
greater the detection probability. A 2012 National Re
search Council (NRC) report has mapped the mag
nitudes and yields that a nuclear test anywhere in
the world would have to exceed in order to be de
tected.6 As shown in figure 3, explosions well below
a kiloton can be detected with 90% confidence.
The probability that a state seeking to violate
the CTBT can repeatedly evade detection drops rap
idly with an increased number of tests. Additionally,
geophysicists Ola Dahlman, Svein Mykkeltveit, and
Hein Haak point out7 that the violator would have
to reduce its test explosion’s yield by a factor of three
to reduce the seismic detection probability from
90% to 10%. Further compounding the risk of being
detected, violators must take into account the syn
ergy provided by other IMS networks, possible onsite inspections, possible excess yields, and informa
tion available from the thousands of seismic stations
operated by academic and disaster-preparedness
organizations to monitor earthquakes.
One evasion scenario, envisioned in the 1950s,
is “cavity decoupling”—the use of a cave or under
ground cavity intended to muffle the seismic waves
from a nuclear explosion and thus reduce the radi
ated signal. Even in that case, according to the 2012
NRC report, “an evasive tester in Asia, Europe,
North Africa, or North America would need to re
strict device yield to levels below 1 kiloton (even if
the explosion were fully decoupled) to ensure no
more than a 10 percent probability of detection for
IMS and open monitoring networks” (page 10).6
And that doesn’t account for the deterrent provided
by states’ national technical means and from the
IMS network of radionuclide sensors.

Iran’s centrifuges
To build a nuclear weapon, one must first produce
the fissile material that powers it. Historically, the
most common path to that end was to extract plu
tonium from the spent fuel rods of heavy-water re
actors that used natural uranium. That method was
India’s path to its 1974 test explosion. A less common
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approach was to enrich uranium to increase the
abundance of its fissile isotope 235U. Uranium en
richment was difficult with bulky gaseous diffusion
technology, and active diplomacy convinced several
nations in the 1970s to abandon plans for reprocess
ing spent fuel.
Thirty years later, centrifuge technology has
advanced sufficiently that it is now the chosen path
for acquiring highly enriched, bomb-grade ura
nium. Because gas centrifuges require much less
power and space than reactors and reprocessing
plants, they are much easier to hide. And their
growing use represents a challenge: how to prevent
the development of nuclear weapons and still allow
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Both goals are
part of the NPT. (See the article by Houston Wood,
Alexander Glaser, and Scott Kemp, PHYSICS TODAY,
September 2008, page 40.)
The enrichment of uranium is measured in
separative work units (SWUs) and is a nonlinear
process. A common light water reactor (LWR) pro
ducing about a gigawatt of electric power consumes
each year approximately 25 tons of 3.75%-enriched
fuel, obtained from 210 tons of natural uranium, and
requires 120 000 SWU. Figure 4 offers an example of
the extent to which the separative work diminishes
as uranium is enriched from its natural form of 0.7%
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Figure 3. The detection capability of the International Monitoring
System’s seismic network is correlated to the magnitude of Earth’s
seismic events. In 2007, when this map was made, the primary network
consisted of 38 stations (dots and triangles) around the world. The
map’s colors correlate the minimum seismic magnitude to the explosive
yield in kilotons in hard rock required for 90%-confidence-level
detection. For example, one can be 90% sure of detecting any tests
above 0.09 kt in Asia, Europe, and North Africa for tamped explosions
in hard rock with better propagation, and 0.22 kt in rock with poorer
propagation. If the confidence level is relaxed to 10% detection, the
yields are reduced by a factor of three. (Adapted from ref. 6, courtesy
of Tormod Kvaerna and Frode Ringdal.)
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U, to its highly (90%) enriched form. It requires
about 800 SWU per ton of uranium to make 130 kg
of 4%-enriched reactor fuel. An additional 300 SWU
yields 26 kg of 20% highly enriched uranium, and a
further 200 SWU yields 5.6 kg of 90% HEU. Put an
other way, it takes about 60% of the total work to
produce low-enriched LWR fuel, 25% of the total to
enrich the fuel to 20%, and another 15% of the total
to raise that amount to 90%. Thus, a stockpile of 20%
enriched material can significantly reduce the time
a country requires to make a nuclear weapon.
Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany,
India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, North Korea,
Pakistan, Russia, the UK, and the US currently en
rich uranium. Commercially enriched stock is
primarily supplied by Europe’s URENCO (10 mil
lion SWU/year), Russia’s Rosatom (26 million), and
France’s AREVA (10 million). Iran’s centrifuges pro
duce 0.8–4 SWU/year,8 and the country has claimed
the right to pursue uranium enrichment in line with
the NPT. But its claim has been a subject of dispute,
considering that Iran had not reported its past en
richment activities to the IAEA. The developments
have prompted condemnation in UN Security Coun
cil resolutions. Other nonweapon states that enrich
uranium have negotiated acceptable reporting and
inspection agreements with the IAEA.
Figure 5 shows the growing numbers of cen
trifuges Iran has installed and is operating at its
large facility in Natanz since 2007. (To date, Natanz
and the other main centrifuge facility, at Fordow, to
gether house 19 000 centrifuges.)
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An agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action be
tween Iran and the P5 (plus Germany) took effect on
20 January 2014. In the agreement, which will last
six months, Iran allows constraints to be placed on
its nuclear program in exchange for a reduction of
$7 billion in economic sanctions. The agreement ap
proximately doubles the “breakout time” needed to
obtain sufficient HEU to build a nuclear weapon;
the IAEA counts 25 kg of 90% HEU as a “significant
quantity,” sufficient for a weapon.
According to the plan,9 Iran agrees to halt ura
nium enrichment above 5% and cap the production
of 3.5%-enriched uranium; dilute or oxidize the
country’s near-20%-enriched stock; stop the instal
lation of additional centrifuges at Natanz, Fordow,
and elsewhere; freeze advances at the country’s
heavy-water reactor in Arak; allow monthly verifi
cation inspections of the reactor and daily inspec
tions of the Natanz and Fordow facilities; provide
access to centrifuges, production facilities, uranium
mines, and mills; and notify the IAEA in a timely
manner about any new nuclear facilities.
The primary goal of the constraints is to main
tain at least a six-month breakout time so that the
UN can respond well before Iran can make suffi
cient weapons-grade uranium if the country re
neges on the agreement. Detection of the production
of uranium enriched over 5% would be a violation
of the joint agreement. David Albright, president of
the nonprofit Institute for Science and International
Security, and colleagues calculate a breakout time of
www.physicstoday.org

Confidence in untested nuclear weapons
The enduring US stockpile consists of several types
of warheads; they include tactical and strategic
bombs and land- and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles. The US has not tested any of them since
1992. The directors of LANL, Lawrence Livermore
(LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories have
concluded that nuclear-explosive testing is not
needed to resolve technical issues concerning the US
nuclear stockpile.
At the November 2013 short course,2 Texas
A&M University’s Marvin Adams surveyed the US
Stockpile Stewardship Program and agreed with a
central conclusion from the NRC’s 2012 report (ref
erence 6, page 1):
Provided that sufficient resources and a
national commitment to stockpile stew
ardship are in place, the committee
judges that the United States has the
technical capabilities to maintain a safe,
secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear
weapons into the foreseeable future
without nuclear-explosion testing. . . .
Sustaining those technical capabilities
will require . . . :
‣ a strong science and engineering base. . . ;
‣ a vigorous surveillance program;
‣ adequate ratio of performance margins
to uncertainties;
‣ modernized production facilities; and
‣ a competent and capable work force.
Stockpile stewardship assesses the status of
warheads, including the impact of changes made to
them, and takes any needed actions to maintain
near certainty that weapons would meet require
www.physicstoday.org

SEPARATIVE WORK (SWU)

six months if Iran kept 150 kg of 20%-enriched mate
rial and 2000 IR-1 centrifuges, 250 kg of 20%-enriched
material and 1000 centrifuges, or no amount of 20%
enriched material and 6000 centrifuges.10
An inspection regime can weigh and examine
cylinders containing feed, product, and wastes to
determine enrichment levels. Radio-frequency iden
tification tags can track the cylinders. Similarly, tags,
seals, and surveillance can be used to keep track of
nuclear activity. Uranium stocks, records, and receipts can be audited. Environmental samples of
soil and water can be obtained in and outside a
plant. Unannounced inspections are useful to detect
undeclared material and operations.
The IAEA and the US have had considerable ex
perience in nuclear monitoring. The technology
used to monitor the “blend-down” of 500 tons of
Russian HEU to reactor fuel is instructive. The den
sity of 235U in the uranium hexafluoride gas can be
determined by measuring the emission of 186-keV
gamma rays from the uranium. And the transmis
sion of 122-keV gamma rays from cobalt-57 through
the UF6 gas determines total uranium density. The
ratio of the two values yields the enrichment level.
Twenty years of monitoring by Oak Ridge and Los
Alamos (LANL) National Laboratories have veri
fied the dilution of Russian HEU in the equivalent
of 20 000 HEU warheads.
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Figure 4. The effort required to enrich uranium and increase the
concentration of its fissile isotope 235U diminishes exponentially as the
concentration rises. The effort is measured in separative work units.
Starting with 1 ton of natural uranium, it takes 800 SWU to produce
4%-enriched reactor fuel, an additional 300 SWU to produce
20%-enriched material for research reactors, and 200 more SWU
to produce 90%-enriched material. (Courtesy of Olli Heinonen.)
ments if used. (See the article by Raymond Jeanloz,
PHYSICS TODAY, December 2000, page 44.) That as
sessment, in practice, translates into monitoring the
warheads, repairing any observed degradation, dis
mantling retired warheads (now about 250 per
year), and extending the life of the remaining stock
piled weapons.
Scientists at LANL and LLNL have determined
a lower limit of 85 to 100 years for the lifetime of a
plutonium “pit,” the part associated with the fission
stage of a nuclear explosive. The JASONs, a group
of technical experts who advise the Defense Depart
ment, agreed with that assessment. One may simply
reuse the plutonium-based pit when a weapon’s life
is extended. However, long-term stockpile steward
ship requires the ability to manufacture new pits.
Currently the Los Alamos Pit Production Facility
fulfills that role and can produce 6–10 pits per year;
further investment could boost its production to as
many as 80 pits per year.
Modifications in the warheads are being consid
ered to enhance their safety, security, and perfor
mance margins as part of upcoming life-extension
programs (LEPs); see PHYSICS TODAY, December
2013, page 26. According to Adams, the actions
being considered in LEPs can include refurbishing
existing warheads, reusing the nuclear components
from different warheads, and replacing nuclear
components with designs not previously in the
stockpile. All LEPs require some manufacturing,
and any change in a weapon requires the assess
ment of experts familiar with the latest advances in
experiments, theory, and computation. Opportuni
ties to introduce changes are relatively rare because
LEPs are carried out on a multidecade time scale.
The following points summarize developments
in stockpile stewardship since the NAS’s 2002 CTBT
study was carried out:
‣ LEPs are a reality, successfully carried out for
land- and submarine-based warheads.
‣ Peta-scale computation is now available to aid
design, stewardship, and understanding of a
weapon’s behavior.
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Professionals in the US should be involved with
related nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and sci
ence issues to maintain their expertise and skills. The
weapons labs should continue to maintain first-rate
facilities, some for unclassified work. Experts out
side the weapons facilities can provide helpful as
sessments, as it is difficult to assess quality “from the
inside.” The gaps in understanding of weapons’ be
havior can be addressed with ongoing experiment,
theory, simulation, and analysis of past data.
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There’s a highly compelling reason the US and other
nuclear-weapon-possessing states don’t test nuclear
weapons: To do so would not only invite a new arms
race, it would make addressing the nuclear pro
grams in Iran and North Korea much harder and
put the nonproliferation regime at risk.
India and Pakistan are examples of what hap
pens in the absence of an arms-control agreement.
Both countries have roughly the same nuclear capa
bility and are continuing to build larger and more
sophisticated arsenals. International efforts to deal
with their competition have not led to a halt, let
alone a reversal. A 2006 agreement between India
and the US gives India more flexibility on nuclear
imports. And the US war in Afghanistan loosened
international pressure on Pakistan’s nuclear pro
grams. One can hope that at least for the near
term, the development of confidence- and securitybuilding measures will give diplomacy time to pre
vent a nuclear crisis.
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Figure 5. The number of Iran’s centrifuges at Natanz (a) in 2013 grew
to nearly 16 000, a roughly 60% increase from the previous year.
Combined with the number at a smaller facility in Fordow, the country
currently has a total of 19 000 centrifuges. Operable centrifuges (black)
are enriching uranium hexafluoride. Inoperable centrifuges (green)
include installed machines not yet fed with UF6 and a large fraction
damaged by sabotage in 2009 and 2010 when the computer virus
Stuxnet infected the operating system. The plateau in late 2013 may be
related to the negotiations between Iran and the P5-plus-1 (the US, UK,
Russia, China, France, and Germany). (Plot courtesy of David Albright.)
(b) Then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects the Natanz nuclear
plant on 8 March 2007. (Photo courtesy of EPA/Landov.)

‣ The National Ignition Facility and Dual-Axis Ra
diographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility have been
completed for studying relevant physics.
‣ The future of the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement Facility at LANL and the
Uranium Production Facility at the Department of
Energy’s Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak
Ridge are in doubt because of cost.
Although the NAS and NRC panels concluded
that the US can maintain a reliable stockpile without
nuclear-explosive testing, the stewardship pro
gram’s future success isn’t guaranteed. The biggest
concern is the ability to attract, develop, and retain
a first-class work force. Adams urges several steps:
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